Recently in United States v. InMobi Pte Ltd., the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) set a new standard for geolocational tracking. The FTC told app developers and app marketers one simple rule: honor consumers location privacy preferences and do not track them without permission.

InMobi is a Singapore Company that provides ads within mobile apps. They are a business-to-business company and its only customers are app developers who integrate InMobi’s software into their apps. InMobi allows for the collection of data from app users to display targeted ads.

Geolocation is often the best data for determining what types of ads to present to users. InMobi offers app developers three options: 1) “now” suite based on current location; 2) “conditional” suite based on customers’ past habits; and 3) “psychographic” suite based on demographics and activities in the last two months (e.g. frequent airport trips, luxury vacations). However, many consumers choose not to allow apps to access their geolocation. So one might think that this InMobi software would be useless for those consumers. On the contrary, InMobi realized they could access geolocation indirectly and still provide value to mobile app developers; InMobi started using data generated when devices connect to WiFi networks, and geolocational data from users who had opted in (i.e., figured out locations of other users by using other similar users’ data). The FTC considered this inference of the user’s location as an improper end-run around. The FTC’s investigation and enforcement against InMobi focused on InMobi’s statements to app developers: “First we take in location data on each user, in the form of user opt-in lat/long signals. Then we add real world context to these signals to figure out what places or businesses the user has visited. Our machine learning algorithms mine for patterns in this location history to identify what these trends mean about the user, from which we can infer what kind of consumer the user is.” The FTC did not consider this statement to be a complete, transparent explanation of how InMobi tracks the app’s users.

After the investigation, the FTC found that InMobi violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) while also accusing InMobi of unfair and deceptive indirect location tracking. The consent decree, however, focused on COPPA and assessed damages only on that violation, while also enjoining InMobi from continuing its geolocation inference system. The FTC did not address the indirect location tracking’s unlawfulness overall.

This means that other app developers and app marketers are now on notice that the FTC considers inferential geolocational tracking to be unlawful (even though the consent decree only addressed monetary assessments under COPPA). After this action, the FTC also warns app developers to consider contractual terms with third party service providers to ensure they do not circumvent consumers’ privacy choices. Certainly sound advice from the FTC.

Vigilant Solutions is a company that takes photographs of cars and trucks using its network of cameras. What’s the big deal, traffic cameras are always recording our plates? Well not only is Vigilant Solutions taking photos of your license plate, but they are retaining your vehicle’s location data along with the photo of your license plate, AND they are selling it. To date, Vigilant Solutions has taken approximately 2.2 billion license plate photos in almost every major city across the United States. Among Vigilant Solutions customers (i.e. those buying your license plate numbers and locational data), 300 of them are law enforcement agencies. You might think to yourself, ‘Well don’t the police need to get a warrant to put a GPS tracking device on my car,’ and the simple answer is yes, but to get years of data on your vehicles location all the police have to do is pay Vigilant Solutions.

Vigilant Solutions subsidiary’s website, Digital Recognition Network, says, “All roads lead to revenue with DRN’s license plate recognition technology. Fortune 1000 financial institutions rely on DRN solutions to drive decisions about loan origination, servicing and collections. Insurance providers turn DRN’s solutions and data into insights to mitigate risk and investigate fraud. And our vehicle location data transforms automotive recovery processes, substantially increasing portfolio returns.” Is this reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984? With this type of tracking technology becoming more and more affordable, we are sure to see an increase in its use before an end. As consumers (and individuals with constitutional rights) we should all be aware of this and speak up for our privacy rights.

On July 31, 2015, Quartavious Davis petitioned for certiorari in Davis v. United States, No. 15-146, asking (1) whether the acquisition of a cell phone user’s location data from his cellular service provider constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and (2) if it is a search, whether the search requires a warrant.

In previous posts, we explained how a number of courts have considered whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant to access cell phone geographic location information.   In May of this year, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Mr. Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location records and, even if there were such an expectation, a warrantless search was still reasonable.

The Supreme Court denied Mr. Davis’s petition on November 9, 2015, but it remains an important issue. As noted in the Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Center for Democracy & Technology, The Constitution Project and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of cell phones and cell sites in the last 20 years.  Additionally, the number of law enforcement requests for location information is increasing, and Courts continue to be faced with resolving whether a warrant is required.

Everyone loves their smartphone. Everyone loves the newest app. Angry Birds has lots of company now. But most people don’t know the back end of apps and how they are accessing, using and selling your data. Why? Because no one reads the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use to figure out how they are accessing and using your data.

The most common features of apps that affect your privacy are the use of the microphone, location based and geolocation services, and access to personal data, like your photos, contacts and health information. Whether you care or not, just be aware of the data apps have access to, are using and selling, and make an educated choice about whether you want them to have access or not. This week, we will focus on apps’ use of your location through location based services.

First, you need to know which apps have requested to track you (and to which you agreed) when you downloaded the app. Touch settings on your phone and go to Privacy. Location based services is listed and is automatically on when you buy an iPhone. Why? Because Apple wants access and has access to your location and requires it for Find Your iPhone. But this means that Apple knows where you are at all times and is selling that data to advertisers so they know which cities you visit, which restaurants you go to, which supermarkets you visit and in general, your minute by minute location. If you browse down location based services, the apps that are following your every step are listed there. Some allow the app to only follow your location when you use their app, but many others automatically track you whether you are using their app or not.

Sound creepy to you? Then my suggestion is to turn your location based services off unless you are using a particular app that requires it. When you are finished using the app, turn your located based services off again. If it is off, none of your location data is being accessed, used or sold by the app developer.

When you download an app, read the fine print on how they are going to access and use your data, including location based services. I have refused to download apps if they won’t give me a choice about using my location. There is usually another app that does the same thing and respects my privacy.

Real story: a friend downloaded a trendy retail app and as she was walking by one of their stores in a mall that was located in another state than where she lived, the app pinged her to tell her that they were having a sale in that location and since she was walking by, she should stop in and check out the sale. Needless to say, it freaked her out and she called me to find out how they knew she was in that mall. Of course, she had her location based services on, and had agreed for the app to use her location based services at all times when she downloaded it. She hadn’t read the pop up information, and just clicked “I agree.”

And if you aren’t creeped out, just be aware of what apps are asking for and doing with your data, and make educated choices when you allow access to your location.

We have been watching the warrantless search cases closely. Yesterday, (August 5, 2015), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was unconstitutional when law enforcement used their cell phone location information without a warrant.

Two defendants were convicted of armed robbery. Some of the evidence presented at their trial included location information from their cell phones. The government obtained the information through a court order, as opposed to a warrant. They appealed the conviction saying the government should not have used the information without a warrant, that the search was a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and that the court order was insufficient.

Although the Court held that obtaining the location information without a warrant was unconstitutional, it agreed with the lower Court’s decision to allow the evidence in the case because the government relied in good faith on the court orders that were issued to obtain the information.

A number of courts have considered whether the Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant to access historical and/or real time cell phone geographic location information, known as CSLI. CSLI is cell site location data your cell phone gives off when you place or receive a call. Additionally, cell phones also automatically generate location data by continually identifying themselves to the closest cell tower even when there is no live call, and some experts say, even if the cell phone is powered off.

Law enforcement views CSLI as vital to locate and track suspects as part of an criminal investigation, and often seeks the information by filing an application with the relevant court simply stating that the information to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing investigation. The applications may or may not include facts establishing probable cause or even distinguish between location information in either historical or real time. Some court orders granting access do not distinguish between historical or real time data.

Court decisions have been divided on whether probable cause and a warrant is required to obtain CSLI.  Last week, a United States District Judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose division affirmed the judge magistrate’s ruling denying the government’s application for CSLI on the grounds that a warrant was required to obtain such information. Also earlier this year, the Florida Supreme Court, in Tracey v. State of Florida, held that real time cell site location information is protected by the Fourth Amendment.

However, in May of this year, in United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an earlier three judge panel upon rehearing en banc, and held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in these cell phone location records and, even if there were such an expectation, a warrantless search would still be reasonable. 785 F.3d 498.

On July 31, Davis’ lawyers petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review and overturn the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Davis v. United States. If the Court accepts the case, perhaps the Court will resolve the issue of whether the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of  CSLI.

While Foursquare’s new product, Pinpoint, surely isn’t the only technology tracking your location these days, with the release of this new product, businesses can transmit targeted advertising depending on an individual’s location (or the individual’s locations in the past).  Pinpoint, which was first announced on April 15, 2015, will send advertisements to individuals’ mobile devices based on where the individual has been physically located lately … or previously located for that matter.  You might be wondering,

But can they send those advertisements to me? I’m not a Foursquare user.

The answer is: yes. Foursquare announced that this new product will use more than just its own databases to expand its geolocational marketing beyond its own troves of user data.  But who will Foursquare get geolocational data on non-Foursquare users from? While the terms of any such agreements are not likely to become public, Foursquare does currently have relationships with third-party data partners like Microsoft, HTC, and Pinterest.  As Pinpoint hits the streets we may begin to see consumer protests against this new kind of privacy invasion. We’ll continue to track its use.

Two California drivers have filed a class action against Axon Enterprise, alleging that the company’s automated license plate reader (ALPR) network tracks and stores California residents’ movements without the privacy disclosures state law requires. The complaint states that Axon’s fixed and police-vehicle cameras capture license plates, locations, timestamps, and vehicle characteristics, and then combines this information with other camera feeds and makes it searchable through its Evidence and Fusus software.

At the center of the case is California’s Automated License Plate Reader Privacy Act. Plaintiffs allege that Axon, as both an ALPR operator and end user, failed to implement and conspicuously post a required usage and privacy policy. According to the regulation, the privacy policy must address topics including authorized uses, access, sharing, security, data accuracy, and retention. The complaint also asserts claims for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution and intrusion upon seclusion, arguing that aggregating location records over time can reveal intimate details of a person’s life.

The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of people whose ALPR information was collected in California and processed or stored by Axon from November 3, 2023, onward. They request class certification, injunctive relief, and actual, liquidated, and punitive damages, among other remedies. For companies that operate surveillance technologies or provide the platforms that store and analyze the resulting data, the suit is a reminder that privacy compliance may turn not only on what customers do, but also on the vendor’s own role in collecting, accessing, and managing information, and on whether required disclosures and controls are in place.

On October 29, 2026, General Motors (GM) agreed to pay $220 million to 35 state Attorneys General over allegations that its Smart Driver program associated with its OnStar service violated the privacy of users. The AGs alleged that GM illegally sold drivers’ private location and driving behavior data to brokers without users’ consent, who then sold it to insurers that allegedly used it to set and increase auto insurance rates.

The complaint against GM included allegations that the data collected and sold included: “huge volumes of consumer driver behavior information, such as hard braking, hard acceleration, hard cornering, crossing of a designated high-speed threshold, seat belt usage, late night driving, and trip time and duration for such events.” Through the OnStar program, GM also collected “precise geolocation data linked to identifiable personal information, including name, address and Vehicle Identification Number.” The geolocation data included latitude and longitude, elevation, speed and a trip identifier that could tie together to “identify the entire route of a specific trip taken by a single vehicle.” Precise geolocation data was collected every three seconds from the time the user turned the vehicle on until the ignition was turned off. The complaint alleged that GM’s enrollment process failed to disclose the sale of their data and “contradicted its representations … that it would only share anonymous driving data with insurance companies. In reality, GM sold the identifiable driving data of all Smart Driver participants” to third parties for its repackaging and sale to insurance companies. The complaint alleges that GM made over $20 million from the sale of the data.

In addition to the settlement amount, the Consent Decree provides that GM agrees to limit the driving data that it collects, obtain express consent from drivers before collecting or sharing the data, develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive information privacy program for the collected driver data, including being transparent with drivers about the collection, use and sale of driver data, employ a Chief Privacy Officer, perform data protection assessments when engaging in a new high risk processing activity, implement data minimization efforts, provide consumers with a transparent privacy notice, and obtain express consent prior to collecting or using driver data. All of these items are solid measures to employ when collecting the type of data that is the subject matter of the settlement.

This settlement follows GM’s prior agreement to pay California $12.7 million to settle an investigation into its alleged sale of driver data to data brokers, and a January 2025 settlement with the Federal Trade Commission to refrain from disclosing vehicle geolocation and driver behavior data to consumer reporting agencies.

Drivers should be aware that their cars are collecting large amounts of very specific data about the functionality of the car, and the behavior of the driver. Be sure to read the privacy policies of the manufacturer so you are educated about the data collected, and used on your vehicle and your driving behavior, and make informed consent prior to the collection and use of that data.

A panel of judges sitting on the federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appeared skeptical of a challenge to the use of automatic license plate readers by the Illinois state police, questioning whether the cameras’ collection of vehicle snapshots amounts to an improper search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs Stephanie Scholl and Frank Bednarz argued that a network of more than 300 cameras near Cook County expressways, combined with 90 days of retained data, lets police reconstruct drivers’ movements without a warrant or probable cause. Plaintiffs argued that compiling a person’s travel over time can reveal more than any single snapshot, and that law-abiding drivers have Fourth Amendment protections. Judge Amy St. Eve, however, questioned whether the plaintiffs’ theory differed meaningfully from circuit precedent involving real-time location tracking.

The government’s attorney countered that the cameras capture license plates at fixed locations on public expressways, and that state law limits both where the cameras may be installed and how the resulting data may be used. The district court dismissed the case, finding the alleged risk of future tracking too abstract to support the requested relief and concluding that the challenged plate reading was not an intrusive search. The federal Department of Justice also supported the state’s position. The Seventh Circuit’s questions suggest that the plaintiffs might face substantial hurdles. However, questions from the bench do not necessarily signal a ruling: we will have to wait until the court releases its formal decision.